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REVENUE RULING 77-290-RECENT
INTERPRETATIONS OF AGENCY LAW
INEQUITABLY TAXES MEMBERS OF
RELIGIOUS ORDERS
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically in the United States religious organizations have been ex-
empted from paying federal income tax.' The underlying rationale for the
tax exemption of churches is that the benefits and services which they pro-
vide to the public would otherwise have to be provided by the government
out of tax revenues.' Currently, each of the fifty states3 and the Federal
Internal Revenue Code4 provide for the tax exemption of churches.
Under the current Federal Code, an organization may be exempted
from federal income tax if it is organized and operated exclusively for a
"religious" purpose." Therefore, churches and their auxiliary organizations
1. Schwarz, Limiting Religious Tax Exemption: When Should the Church Render
Unto Ceasar?, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 50, 54 (1976) ("The practice of granting tax benefits to
religious organizations has a long history, dating back to pre-Revolutionary times."). See Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970) (religious organizations have always been expressly
exempt from federal income taxes); P. TREUSCH & N. SUGARMAN, TAX EXEMPT CHARITABLE
ORGANIZATIONS 4 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing the historical origins and statutory development
of tax exemption for charitable organizations); Zollman, Tax Exemptions of American
Church Property, 14 MICH. L. REv. 646 (1916) (history of tax exemptions accorded religion).
2. See Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924) (tax exemption for reli-
gious organizations is made in recognition of the benefit the public receives from the organiza-
tion's activities); B. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 5 (5th ed. 1987);
("[T]he exemption for charitable organizations is a derivative of the concept that they perform
functions which, in the organization's absence, government would have to perform; therefore,
government is willing to forego the otherwise tax revenues in return for the public services
rendered."). For another view, see D. KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES SHOULD NOT PAY TAXES 46
(1977) (religion enjoys a preferred position because it performs the special function of satisfy-
ing the need for ultimate meaning in life and thereby provides a sense of hope and purposeful-
ness to members of society).
3. Walz, 397 U.S. at 676 ("All of the 50 States provide for tax exemption of places of
worship, most of them doing so by constitutional guarantees.").
4. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1954). This section describes the organizations that are exempt
from taxation: "Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals .. " Id.
5. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(i)(a) ("An organization may be exempt as an
organization described in section 501(c)(3) if it is organized and operated exclusively for one
or more of the following purposes: (a) Religious .... ").
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that further a religious purpose are exempt from federal income tax.' Qual-
ifying auxiliary organizations include parochial schools and religious
orders. 7
A religious order is a communal group, a relatively small group of per-
sons who live together and share their work and earnings.8 As such, the
members of a religious order do not pursue their own personal goals.
Rather, each member acts in furtherance of the order's religious purposes.'
The members relinquish personal independence and agree to accept the au-
thority of the church.' 0 This agreement is formally expressed by a require-
ment that the member take vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience to the
order."
Members of religious orders are often required to provide services for
their supervising church and are paid wages for doing so.'2 The IRS recog-
nizes that the wage a member earns in this way is income to the order and
not to the member.' 3 The member did not act on his or her own behalf.' 4
Rather, the member was an agent of the religious order and acted to fur-
ther the religious purposes of the church.' 5 Therefore, income that the
member earned is tax-exempt income to the order.'6
A similar situation arises where a member of a religious order per-
forms services for an employer who is not affiliated with the supervising
church.' 7 If the member receives wages from this outside employment but,
as required by his vow of poverty, turns all of his wages over to his order, a
6. B. HOPKINS, supra note 2, at 190.
7. Id.
8. See generally SACRAMENTUM MUNDI 67-70 (K. Rahner ed. 1970) (discussing reli-
gious orders).
9. See NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 287-93 (McGraw-Hill 1967) (discussing reli-
gious life).
10. Id. (the members commit their present and future possessions, earnings, and ser-
vices to the community; in return, the order provides its members with food, shelter, and all
other necessities of life).
11. Id.
12. For example, a nun with a business degree may be ordered to work in the business
office of the church's community college. The nun will typically be paid wages the same as a
lay person, but the nun will be required by her vow of poverty to turn the remuneration over to
the order.
13. Rev. Rul. 77-290, 1977-2 C.B. 26 [hereinafter Rev. Rul. 77-290].
14. Id.
15. Id. In Rev. Rul. 77-290, the Service held that a member of a religious order under
a bona fide vow of poverty who worked directly for her church business office was an agent of
the religious order and was not required to include the remuneration remitted to the order in
gross income.
16. Id. (provided, however, that the order qualifies as a tax-exempt entity).
17. For example, a nun with a nursing degree may be required to work in a local
charitable hospital that provides services to the poor, even though the hospital is not operated
by the church.
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critical question is raised: Should the wages be considered income to the
individual member and subject to taxation or income to the order and,
therefore, tax exempt? Until 1977, an early pronouncement of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, Office Decision 119,18 answered this question.
Since 1919, O.D. 119 has provided that if a member of a religious
order, pursuant to his vows of poverty, turned in all income to the order, the
member was not taxed on that income. 9 Under O.D. 119, when a member
of a religious order earned income while working for the supervising church
or while working for a secular employer, but remitted that income to the
order, the income was recognized as the income of the order and was not
subject to federal income taxation.2"
In 1977, the IRS published Revenue Ruling 77-290 which drastically
changed the settled practice that resulted from the consistent application of
O.D. 119. Under Revenue Ruling 77-290, the IRS currently imposes a tax
on remuneration received by members of religious orders from employment
outside the order.2 1 Apparently the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 77-290 to
18. 1 C.B. 82 (1919). In 1919 the IRS was titled the Bureau of Internal Revenue and
its official pronouncements were cited as Office Decisions (O.D.); the official pronouncements
of the IRS are now cited as Revenue Rulings.
19. O.D. 119, 1 C.B. 82 (1919) provided:
A clergyman is not liable for any income tax on the amount received by him during
the year from the parish of which he is in charge, provided that he turns over to the
religious order of which he is a member, all the money received in excess of his actual
living expenses, on account of the vow of poverty which he has taken.
Members of the religious orders are subject to tax upon taxable income, if any, re-
ceived by them individually, but are not subject to tax on income received by them
merely as agents of the orders of which they are members.
Id.
See also Maryland v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 347 (1920) (receipt of income by an
agent is regarded as receipt by his principal when the agent, acting within his scope of agency,
earns income on behalf of the principal and remits the income to the principal); 2 MERTENS,
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 17.11, at 70 (J. Doheny ed. 1982) (money received by
a minister as an agent for a church is not taxable to him); Reed, Revenue Ruling 77-
290-Vow of Poverty, 24 CATH. LAW. 217 (1979) (O.D. 119 was based on agency law).
Since 1919, O.D. 119 was the settled law regarding the levying of federal income taxes on
members of religious orders who were under a vow of poverty. See generally Philipps, But
Reverend, Why Does Your Baptismal Font Have a Diving Board? Equitable Treatment for
Vows of Poverty Under the Federal Income Tax, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 19, 22-24 (1987)
[hereinafter Philipps, Vows of Poverty] (discussing the history and policy of O.D. 119).
20. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,104,005, reprinted in 1981 Fed. Taxes (P-H) 696 (1981 pri-
vate letter rulings). See also Gen. Couns. Mem. 24,316 (1944) (interpreting O.D. 119 to ex-
clude from gross income money received by religious members "who individually perform ser-
vices under circumstances resulting in compensation being paid for such service by
organizations other than the religious order of which they are members.").
21. Rev. Rul. 77-290 (In Rev. Rul. 77-290, the Service took the position that a mem-
ber of a religious order under a bona fide vow of poverty who was employed as an attorney
with a private law firm had to include remuneration received from the firm in his gross income
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prevent the use of bogus church schemes to avoid taxation.22 In bogus
church schemes, taxpayers create organizations that are purportedly
churches or religious orders but in reality are hollow entities designed to
shield the taxpayers' income from taxation.23 The taxpayers assign all their
income to their organization and claim they have given the organization
their money because they have taken a vow of poverty.24 As a result, before
Revenue Ruling 77-290 was issued, the IRS had difficulty collecting taxes
from the taxpayers or their organizations in these situations.
The IRS' issuance of Revenue Ruling 77-290 has distressed the reli-
gious community, which believes that the ruling is an unjust response to the
rise of bogus church schemes. Members of bona fide religious orders who
have been subjected to taxation have litigated cases in an attempt to estab-
lish precedent overturning Revenue Ruling 77-290.25 Unfortunately for
bona fide religious orders and their members, the IRS has defeated this
attempt. The IRS has successfully defended Revenue Ruling 77-290 as a
valid, equitable ruling by asserting that members of religious orders are not
agents of their order when they are employed by someone other than their
supervising church.26 The acceptance of the IRS' narrow definition of
agency has prevented bogus church schemes from sheltering the income of
taxpayers who do not abide by vows of poverty. Needlessly, however, this
solution to the schemes inequitably taxes religious members who have taken
bona fide vows of poverty and who historically have been granted tax-ex-
empt status.
This note will begin with a history of the tax exemption of churches
and explain how this favorable tax treatment has resulted in the use of
bogus church schemes for tax avoidance purposes.27 This note will then
evaluate the methods that the IRS currently employs to suppress these
schemes.28 Also, the agency theories that the IRS has developed will be
even though the remuneration was turned over to the order.).
22. Philipps, Vows of Poverty, supra note 19, at 43 (discussing the unfairness of the
Service's abrupt change in position in the vow of poverty situation).
23. See infra notes 59, 69-72 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
25. Dessingue, Discrete Tax Issues for Clergy and Religious, 28 CATH. LAW. 149, 156
(1983). See Reed v. United States, No. 16-82T (Ct. Cl. filed July 30, 1982); Sampson v.
United States, No. 17-82T (Ct. Cl. filed Jan. 12, 1982); Kircher v. United States, No. 694-
81T (Ct. Cl. filed Dec. 1, 1981); Waldschmidt v. United States, No. 695-81T (Ct. Cl. filed
Dec. 1, 1981).
26. The courts have accepted this formulation of agency law and have held that if a
member of a religious order contracts individually with a secular employer, then the member
has an employee-employer relationship with that employer and cannot be acting as an agent on
behalf of the order. See infra text accompanying notes 128-169 for an extensive discussion of
agency law.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 31-104.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 105-27.
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compared with Restatement agency law for the purpose of showing that a
proper application of agency law to the relationship between religious or-
ders and their members will preserve the tax-exempt status of bona fide
religious members." Finally, this note will discuss the power of the IRS to
revoke the exempt status of bogus churches as a fair and effective way to
suppress bogus church schemes.3 0
II. TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHURCHES
A. Internal Revenue Code Section 501
Religious organizations were given tax-exempt status under the Reve-
nue Act of 1894,31 and they still retain this preferred position.32 Internal
Revenue Code Section 501(a)33 allows an exemption from taxation for an
organization that is described in section 501(c).34 Section 501(c)(3) lists the
various entities that may qualify for tax exemption and includes those orga-
nizations that are organized and operated exclusively for a religious pur-
pose. 5 Further, section 501(c)(3) sets out two tests that a religious organi-
zation must meet before it will be granted exempt status: an organizational
test and an operational test.38 An organization must meet both tests before
it will qualify for exemption from federal income taxation as a religious
entity.37
The organizational test of section 501(c) discloses the standard an or-
ganization must meet before the IRS will view it as an organization formed
exclusively for "religious" purposes.38 Specifically, the organization's char-
29. See infra text accompanying notes 128-228.
30. See knfra text accompanying notes 229-42.
31. Internal Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556 (1894) (charitable,
religious, and educational organizations were given exempt status).
32. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), supra note 4.
33. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1954) ("An organization described in subsection (c) . . .shall be
exempt from taxation under this subtitle ... .
34. See supra note 4.
35. See supra note 4.
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(a)(1) ("In order to be exempt as an organization de-
scribed in section 501(c)(3), an organization must be both organized and operated exclusively
for one or more of the purposes specified in such section.").
37. Id. ("If an organization fails to meet either the organizational test or the opera-
tional test, it is not exempt."). See also Harding Hospital, Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d
1068, 1072 (6th Cir. 1974) (the requirements in section 501(c)(3) are stated in the conjunc-
tive; the organization must meet both tests to qualify for tax exemption).
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(1)(i) provides that:
An organization is organized exclusively for one or more exempt purposes only if its
articles of organization . . .(a) limit the purposes of such organization to one or more
exempt purposes; and (b) do not expressly empower the organization to engage, otherwise
than as an insubstantial part of its activities, in activities which in themselves are not in
furtherance of one or more exempt purposes.
1988]
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ter must limit its purposes to "religious" purposes and not expressly author-
ize the organization to carry on, other than as an insubstantial part of its
activities, those activities that do not further "religious" purposes. 39 Al-
though the availability of tax-exempt status for a religious organization is
contingent upon the organization having a religious purpose, neither the
courts nor the legislature have provided a definition of the terms "religious"
or "religion" for tax purposes.40 Consequently, the IRS has difficulty chal-
lenging the validity of a religion or a church as a means of revoking its tax-
exempt status. Due to the intrinsic difficulties in applying the organizational
test to religious organizations, the IRS must also look to the operational
test when attempting to revoke the tax-exempt status of bogus churches."1
Id.
39. Id.
40. See B. HOPKINS, supra note 2, at 184-98 (discussing the concepts of "religion" and
"religious" as used for tax purposes); Kurtz, Difficult Definitional Problems in Tax Adminis-
tration: Religion and Race, 23 CATI. LAW. 301 (1978) [hereinafter Kurtz, Difficult Defini-
tional Problems] (discussing the difficult first amendment concerns of the IRS). See also
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (the IRS cannot evaluate the content of a reli-
gious belief to determine if an organization is formed for a religious purpose as long as that
belief is parallel to a belief in God); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (the IRS
will not question the nature of religious beliefs if no clear showing exists that the beliefs are
not sincerely held); Worthing, "Religion" and "'Religious Institutions" Under the First
Amendment, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 313, 332 (1980) ("In summary, 'religion' under federal
and state statutes has been held to encompass nontheistic beliefs which occupy a place in the
lives of their possessors parallel to that occupied by belief in God in a person with traditional
religious faith."); Note, Mail Order Ministries, The Religious Purpose Exemption, and The
Constitution, 3 TAX LAW. 959, 964 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Mail Order Ministries] (the
IRS cannot revoke exempt status from a church merely because of the lack of a theistic
creed).
In some rare cases, however, the practices of a religion are so extreme that the courts will
rule that the religious practices can be prohibited without violating the first amendment.
United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968), is a case on point. In Kuch, the
defendant was convicted of possessing and selling marijuana and LSD after unsuccessfully
arguing that her religious beliefs, as a member of the Neo-American Church, required her to
ingest psychedelic drugs. The court concluded that the dividing line between what is and what
is not a bona fide religion is difficult to draw. Nevertheless, the court held that the members of
the Neo-American Church were not engaging in the practice of religion, but were merely
mocking established institutions. Id. at 452. In support of its position the court cited the fol-
lowing: (1) the head of the Church was referred to as the Chief Boo Hoo, a position roughly
corresponding to a bishop; (2) the principles of the Church were that "psychedelic substances,
such as LSD, are the true Host of the Church, not drugs" and "it is the Religious duty of all
members to partake of the sacraments on regular occasions"; (3) the Church's official "Cate-
chism and Handbook" stated that "we have the right to practice our religion, even if we are a
bunch of filthy, drunken bums"; (4) the Church's symbol is a three-eyed toad; (5) the Church
key is the bottle opener; (6) the Church's official songs are "Puff the Magic Dragon" and
"Row, Row, Row Your Boat"; and (7) the Church motto is "Victory over Horseshit!".
Describing the church as being "full of goofy nonsense", the court ruled that the church was
not a religion within the meaning of the first amendment. Id. at 444.
41. Note, Mail Order Ministries, supra note 40, at 964 (the difficulty of defining "reli-
gious purpose" precludes the use of the organizational test to prevent bogus church schemes;
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 [1988], Art. 11
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The operational test, an additional test that a religious organization
must meet to obtain exempt status, requires that the organization be oper-
ated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes.4 2 According to the De-
partment of Treasury regulations, the operational test must be satisfied in-
dependently of, and in addition to, the organizational test.4 3 Four elements
must be met for an organization to satisfy the operational test.4" First, the
organization must engage primarily in activities that accomplish an exempt
purpose as specified in section 501(c)(3). 45 The purpose of the activities,
and not the nature of the activities, determines if the organization will qual-
ify for an exemption.4" The important question is whether the church's pri-
mary purpose in conducting a trade or business is to further religious pur-
poses or whether its primary purpose is a non-exempt one of producing net
profits for the church.47
The second element of the operational test states that the organiza-
tion's net earnings may not inure to the benefit of private individuals. 4 To
satisfy this element of the test, a church must show that it is not operated
to benefit designated individuals, the founder or his family, or the share-
the Service must rely on the operational test in examination of bogus churches).
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (defining the operational test); see infra notes 45,
48, 51-52.
43. See supra notes 36-37. See also P. TREUSCH & N. SUGARMAN, supra note 1, at 73-
78 (discussing the operational test).
44. Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying
the four elements of the operational test to the Church of Scientology).
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) provides that:
An organization will be regarded as "operated exclusively" for one or more exempt pur-
poses only if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such
exempt purposes specified in section 501(c)(3). An organization will not be so regarded if
more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt
purpose.
Id.
See Church by Mail, Inc. v. Commissioner, 765 F.2d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1985) (church
failed the operational test because it was operated for the substantial non-exempt purpose of
providing a market for services of an advertising agency owned and controlled by ministers).
46. B. HOPKINS, supra note 2, at 88 (discussing the "exempt purposes" criterion of the
operational test). See also Miss Georgia Scholarship Fund, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 267
(1979) (organization did not qualify for tax exemption because the organization's sole activity
was the granting of scholarships, which had the primary purpose of providing compensation).
47. B. HOPKINS, supra note 2, at 89. Thus, a church can engage in a trade or business,
such as a bakery, and retain tax-exempt status provided the activity furthers an exempt pur-
pose, i.e., the money earned from the bakery is used to send underprivileged children to sum-
mer camp. See also B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352, 356 (1978) (applying
the operational test to an organization's commercial business).
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(2) ("An organization is not operated exclusively for one or
more exempt purposes if its net earnings inure in whole or in part to the benefit of private
shareholders or individual."). See also Church by Mail, 765 F.2d at 1391 (tax exemption
properly revoked upon a finding that income from church inured to the benefit of private
persons).
1988]
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holders of the organization.' 9 The church may, however, receive reasonable
compensation for goods or services that it provides to others, such as a rea-
sonable amount of rent received from couples using church facilities for
wedding receptions. 50
A third element of the operational test provides that the religious or-
ganization may not expend a substantial part of its resources attempting to
influence legislation or political campaigns.5 This element of the test pre-
vents "action" organizations, such as those that expend substantial amounts
to support voter registration drives, from obtaining exempt status.5 2 None-
theless, an organization is allowed to advocate, as an insubstantial part of
its activities, the adoption or rejection of legislation.53
The fourth and final element of the operational test requires the organ-
ization to serve a valid public purpose and to confer a public benefit.5" This
element of the test ensures that the legislative intent of the Code is not
frustrated.55 Tax-exempt status for religious organizations is intended to be
available only to those organizations that are charitable under the common-
law standards.56 These common-law standards require that an organization
not act contrary to public policy.57 If an organization satisfies each of these
49. P. TREUSCH & N. SUGARMAN, supra note 1, at 162.
50. Id. at 163 ("To a certain extent, inurement in the broader sense is entirely accept-
able, such as reasonable compensation for goods and services.").
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(i) ("An organization is not operated exclusively
for one or more exempt purposes if it is an 'action' organization .
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(c)(3)(ii) provides:
An organization is an "action" organization if a substantial part of its activities is at-
tempting to influence legislation by propaganda or otherwise. For this purpose, an organi-
zation will be regarded as attempting to influence legislation if the organization: (a) con-
tacts, or urges the public to contact members of a legislative body for the purpose of
proposing, supporting, or opposing legislation; or (b) advocates the adoption or rejection
of legislation.
Id.
53. id.
54. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983) (tax-exempt institution
must not act contrary to public policy).
55. See B. HOPKINS, supra note 2, at 142-45.
56. Id. at 65-70 (discussing the federal tax law definition of "charity"). See also Bob
Jones, 461 U.S. at 586 ("Underlying all relevant parts of the code is the intent that entitle-
ment to tax exemption depends on meeting certain common-law standards of charity .... ");
Rev. Rul. 77-290 (the organization's resources must be devoted to purposes that qualify as
exclusively charitable within the meaning of section 501(c)(3) of the Code and the applicable
regulations).
57. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 586. See also Simon, Applying the Bob Jones Public-Policy
Test in Light of TWR and U.S. Jaycees, 62 J. TAX'N 166, 168 (1985) ("After Bob Jones no
organization will be entitled to exempt status if it violates a 'fundamental public policy' ...
the implementation of the public policy test should be free of problems and should result in an
effective and careful adminstration of the tax laws."); Galvin & Devins, A Tax Policy Analy-
sis of Bob Jones University v. United States, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1354 (1983) ("[T]he
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four elements of the operational test, and is formed exclusively for "reli-
gious" purposes as required by the organizational test, then the organiza-
tion will be recognized as a tax-exempt entity.58
B. Bogus Church Schemes
The availability of tax exemptions for churches under section 501 re-
sulted in a proliferation of bogus churches: organizations that fit the form,
but not the substance, of a tax-exempt church.59 As a device to shelter in-
come from taxation, the purpose of a bogus church or religious order is to
circumvent the tax law that prevents a mere assignment of income from
relieving a taxpayer of liability.60 This law provides that if a taxpayer has
the right and power to receive income, but donates the income to another,
the taxpayer and not the actual recipient of the income is liable for the tax
on the income."' Agency law, however, provides that when a person earns
income while acting as an agent on behalf of a principal, the principal and
Court interpreted the applicable Code provisions under which Bob Jones University claimed
tax exemption [I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)] as requiring that the institution confer a 'public benefit'
and have a purpose in harmony with a 'common community conscience'.").
58. Harding Hospital, Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir. 1974). See
also B. HOPKINS, supra note 2, at 660 (discussing the requirements of tax-exempt status).
59. See, e.g., Mathis v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1067 (1986); Starks v. Com-
missioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 443 (1986); Roben v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 407
(1986); Grew v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 405 (1986); Martin v. Commissioner, 51
T.C.M. (CCH) 403 (1986); Van Cleve v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 1353 (1985);
Gambardella v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331 (1985); Neil v. Commissioner, 50
T.C.M. (CCH) 1254 (1985); Gookin v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 1162 (1985).
60. See Stephenson v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 995 (1982), aff'd, 748 F.2d 331 (6th Cir.
1984). In Stephenson, a taxpayer created a branch of the Life Science Church to escape taxa-
tion. When the IRS assessed additional tax for attempted tax evasion, the taxpayer asserted
that he had no intent to evade taxes as he honestly believed he was legally exempt from taxa-
tion. The court held that the church was simply a camouflage that the taxpayer tried to use to
shelter himself from taxes. When the taxpayer executed a "vow of poverty" and created the
"church," he understood the supposed tax benefits he might receive by assigning his income to
a church. Although the vow of poverty purported to transfer all his assets and income to the
"church," it also provided that all the property was to revert to him if "civil government
officialdom were to 'void' this act ... by blocking the rightful tax exempt status of the church
or order." Id.
61. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930) (expressing the hornbook law regard-
ing the assignment of income):
There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and pro-
vide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts how-
ever skilfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in
the man who earned it. That seems to us the import of the statute before us and we think
that no distinction can be taken according to the motive leading to the arrangement by
which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew.
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not the agent has the right and the power to receive the income.02 The
principal has a superior claim of right to the income; the agent has not
"merely assigned" the income to him. 3 Therefore, the principal and not the
agent is liable for the tax on that income."4 Consequently, in a bogus
church scheme the taxpayer's motive is to create the appearance that he
earned his income while he was acting as an agent on behalf of a church or
religious order.
When a member of a religious order earns income while acting as an
agent of the order, such income belongs to the order and not to the mem-
ber.65 If the religious order qualifies for tax-exempt status,6 6 all income that
a member earns as an agent for the order is free from taxation.6 7 Therefore,
if a taxpayer is able to contend that he earned his income while acting on
behalf of a religious order, he is in a position to assert that as an agent of
the order he did not have the right or the power to receive the income that
he earned. Furthermore, the taxpayer can assert that his principal, the
church or order that he formed, is a tax-exempt entity. Under such a
scheme the taxpayer is arguably not liable for tax on income that he
earned, because he remitted it to his church or order. The taxpayer in this
bogus church scheme, however, is in complete control of the church that he
created; he has the authority to direct that the church's funds be used as he
believes is appropriate. In other words, he is able to use the tax-free income
to satisfy his personal needs and desires.68
In a typical bogus church plan, a taxpayer receives, either through the
mail or directly from the church's founder, a set of minister's credentials
and a charter for a church or religious order.0 9 In a bogus church plan, the
62. Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342 (1920).
63. Id. at 347.
64. Id.
65. Rev. Rul. 77-290, restating O.D. 119: "Income earned or received by a taxpayer as
a principal, and not as an agent, is taxable to the taxpayer ... [but] where an agent receives
income on behalf of a principal, the income is not taxable to the agent but to the principal."
Id.
66. See supra notes 37-53 and accompanying text.
67. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342 (1920) (principal is
taxed on amounts agent earns); I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), supra note 4 (a religious organization is
tax exempt if it is organized and operated for a religious purpose).
68. See infra notes 69-104 and accompanying text.
69. Kurtz, Difficult Definitional Problems, supra note 40, at 305:
While the "plans" vary in certain respects, a common theme calls for an individual to
obtain minister's credentials and a charter for a church or religious order by mail for a
fee from churches that may or may not be recognized as exempt from federal income tax
under I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3). No profession of adherence to a creed, dogma, or moral code is
required and no duties of fiduciary responsibilities are undertaken in order to receive and
administer these charters or credentials.
The "plan" then calls for the individual to take a "vow of poverty..... Under the
"plan" less then ten percent of the remaining assigned income is utilized for gifts to the
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taxpayer does not join a communal group that is bonded together by com-
mon vows to support the church and its purposes. Rather, the taxpayer cre-
ates the entity solely to enable him to pursue his personal goal of sheltering
his income from taxation. 70
A religious order created under a bogus church plan is necessarily con-
structed so as to closely resemble a bona fide religious order. The taxpayer
frequently takes a "vow of poverty" and claims that he has given the reli-
gious order his income in accordance with that vow. 71 Similar to a member
of a true religious order, the taxpayer remits his assets and income to the
church or order. Unlike members of true religious orders, however, the tax-
payer is not subject to the authority of the church, but instead retains con-
trol over the church and is able to hold and dispense with the funds and
property of the church.7 2
The Calvary Temple Church 3 is a recent example of a bogus religious
order whose members took a sham vow of poverty. Robert E. McCurry
founded the Calvary Temple Church in East Point, Georgia in 1958 and
served as the church's first and only pastor. 4 In 1984, the church had ap-
proximately 300 members and roughly twenty "religious orders,"" each
comprised only of the members of one family.76 Additionally, each order
executed identical preprinted documents entitled "Statement of Christian
Faith and Application" and "Irrevocable Gift and Vow of Poverty. ' 77 Nev-
ertheless, the taxpayers managed their finances as they wished and took
their checks home rather than depositing the checks in their order's account
or lockbox.7 8 The church placed no restrictions on the taxpayers' use of the
money.79 Some of the taxpayers used the income they purportedly turned
poor, prayer books, bibles, and other church functions.
Typically, the solicitations conclude that a vow of poverty can make a person rich.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Ebner, 782 F.2d 1120, 1122 (2d Cir. 1986) (the princi-
pal belief of the Life Science Church, a bogus church created by a disbarred lawyer, was that
Americans were overtaxed and had the right to choose not to pay taxes).
71. See, e.g., McGahen v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 468 (1981), afJfd mem., 734 F.2d
664 (1983).
72. See id.
73. See Pollard v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1303 (1984), aff'd, 786 F.2d 1063
(11th Cir. 1986).
74. Pollard, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1306.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Pollard, 786 F.2d at 1065 (appellants continued to handle their financial affairs in
the same manner before and after their vows of poverty).
79. Pollard, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1311. As the court noted:
The members of each order retain complete control over their assets and income at all
times. Although the members of some of these "religious orders" have opened checking
accounts in their order's names and have transferred title to land and automobiles to
their order, they still use and deal with these assets for personal purposes as if they were
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over to the order to purchase cars, boats, and real estate in their own
names.80 In short, the members of the Calvary Temple Church retained the
same control over their property after taking their alleged vows of poverty
as they had before.
In contrast, members of a bona fide religious order have no right to, or
control over, their property after taking a vow of poverty.81 Upon admission
to the order the member must either legally transfer his property to others,
such as friends or family members, or make such a transfer to the order so
that the order holds valid title to the property. 2 If a member leaves the
order, the property that he turned over to the order while he was a member
remains with the order.83 The member cannot regain control over the prop-
erty.8 Also, although the order provides food and shelter for the members,
the members' needs are met by the mutual efforts of all.85 The necessities of
life that are provided to each member do not exceed what is strictly neces-
sary for communal existence.88 The members are required to forego the
material rewards of their work efforts so that the religious order can engage
in charitable programs for the public benefit.
Despite the obvious sham that the Calvary Temple Church "religious
orders" were devising, the taxpayers claimed that, by reasons of their vow
of poverty, they did not receive any taxable income for the years in ques-
tion.8 7 One taxpayer, Eric Pollard, was a member of the "Pollard Christian
Religious Order of Saints," which was purportedly an integrated auxiliary
in their own names.
Id.
80. Id.
81. See generally CODE OF CANON LAW, INSTITUTES OF CONSECRATED LIFE AND SO-
CIETIES OF APOSTOLIC FAITH 668 (A. Mitchell trans. 1983) [hereinafter CODE OF CANON
LAW], section 3 of which provides in pertinent part: Whatever a religious acquires by personal
labor or on behalf of the [order] belongs to the [order] . . . Id.
82. Id.
83. See id. at Canon 702 § 1, which provides in pertinent part: § 1 Whoever lawfully
leaves a religious [order] or is lawfully dismissed from one, cannot claim anything from the
[order] for any work done in it. Id.
84. Id.
85. See generally L. FANFANI & K. O'ROURKE, CANON LAW FOR RELIGIOUS WOMEN
75-82 (discussing life in a religious order); B. HOPKINS, supra note 2, at 191 (discussing a
1981 general counsel memorandum which describes communal groups that qualify as religious
organizations).
86. See L. FANFANI & K. O'ROURKE, supra note 85, at 190. See also CODE OF CANON
LAW, supra note 76, at Canon 600, which provides: "The evangelical counsel of poverty in
imitation of Christ . . . entails a life which is poor in reality and in spirit, sober and industri-
ous, and a stranger to earthly riches." Id.
87. Pollard v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1303, 1324-25 (1984) (the members
argued that any remuneration received for their services performed for third parties was as the
agent of their respective "religious orders" which are "integrated auxiliaries" of Calvary Tem-
ple Church).
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of Calvary Temple Church.88 Pollard worked for Federal Express Corpora-
tion as a courier.89 In 1980 he received $25,031.85 as remuneration for his
services.90 He was paid with checks payable to "Eric Pollard" and no other
person had a right to cash the checks. 9 '
On his 1980 tax return, Pollard listed his occupation as a member of a
religious order and did not report the receipt of any taxable income.92
When the IRS conducted an audit, Pollard, like other members of Calvary
Temple Church "religious orders," argued that the remuneration he re-
ceived while working for a third party, Federal Express, was earned while
he was acting as an agent of his "religious order."93 As O.D. 119 provides,
when a member of a religious order earns income while working for a secu-
lar employer, but remits that income to the order pursuant to a vow of
poverty, the income is not subject to taxation.94 The member is held to be
an agent of the church and is not acting in his individual capacity. 95 Thus,
Pollard, a member of a "religious order" who had taken a "vow of pov-
erty," argued that he was not liable for any tax on his 1980 income. 98
Yet, although Pollard signed a "vow of poverty," stating that he gave
all of his property and future remuneration to the "Pollard Christian Reli-
gious Order of Saints," the money never left Pollard's possession. 97 No ac-
counting records were kept by Pollard's "religious order" to ensure that the
money was spent to further religious purposes.98 The vow of poverty that
Pollard signed provided that Pollard should receive a modest allowance to
be used for living expenses.9 9 Accordingly, Pollard submitted a "Request
for Allowances and Allotments" to Pastor McCurry. 00 Pastor McCurry
then gave Pollard permission to use his entire yearly income as he wished,
and Pollard subsequently purchased numerous personal items, including a
home and a car to which he received exclusive title.110
88. Id. at 1320.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1326.
94. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
96. Pollard v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1303, 1326 (1984). The Tax Court
stated: "[W]e must hold that these petitioners have also failed in their burden of proving that
their receipt of remuneration from third parties for services rendered was merely as the agent
of Calvary Temple Church. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1325.
99. Id. at 1326.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1320.
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Pollard's church, the Calvary Temple Church, is only one of many
churches that create bogus religious orders to enable taxpayers to evade the
IRS.""2 The key to the bogus church schemes is the use of agency principles
to shift the taxpayer's income to a tax-free entity. 10 3 The IRS, however,
became acutely aware that taxpayers were relying on previous liberal inter-
pretations of O.D. 119 to evade taxation and began to tighten up agency
law as it pertained to members of religious orders.""
III. IRS RESPONSE TO BOGUS CHURCH SCHEMES
Before the rapid growth of bogus church schemes in the 1970s, the
IRS applied O.D. 119 liberally. 0 5 The IRS had not yet found it necessary
to distinguish between a member who worked for a secular employer and a
member who worked for an employer who was affiliated with the order.106
The IRS did not doubt that members of bona fide religious orders who
worked for secular employers were acting on behalf of their order and in
furtherance of sincere religious purposes. 07 Unlike the individuals who
later employed the guise of heavenly devotion to God as a scam to avoid
their earthly duty of paying taxes, members of bona fide religious orders
clearly did not benefit in monetary terms from their preferred status as
agents of a tax-free entity.0 8 In practice, until the late 1970s when bogus
churches became a major problem, the IRS held the position that members
of religious orders were agents of their orders when they received wages for
rendering services to secular employers. 09
An example of the liberal application of O.D. 119 is found in a 1968
revenue ruling," 0 which held that a nun who worked for a private non-
profit hospital was acting as an agent of her order even though she was an
employee of the hospital.1" The nun had no claim of right to the wages
102. See, e.g., Larsen v. Commissioner, 765 F.2d 939 (9th Cir. 1985) (Universal Life
Church); Uhrig v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1355 (1985) (Glenelg Church of Divine
Blessings); Owens v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 157 (1982) (Objectivist Assembly);
Schilberg v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 148 (1982) (Church of United Brotherhood);
Brown v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 542 (1980) (Church of the Brothers).
103. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 110-27 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
110. Rev. Rul. 68-123, 1968-1 C.B. 35.
111. Id. Rev. Rul. 68-123 states in pertinent part: "[Almounts received from a hospital
for services performed by a registered nurse who is a member of a religious organization ex-
empt from Federal income tax [under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954] are
excludable from her gross income." Rev. Rul. 68-123, 1968-1 C.B. 35.
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that the hospital paid to her, and she was under the general control of the
order at all times.112 The order made the arrangements for the nun's em-
ployment at the hospital and expected the nun to follow the rules of the
order while carrying out her employment, although the hospital supervised
the nun's day-to-day activities."1 Thus, as late as 1968 the IRS did not
question the fact that members of religious orders who performed outside
employment were agents of their order and therefore were tax exempt.
Throughout the 1970s there was a steady increase in the number of
taxpayers who utilized the agency principles that are the foundation of bo-
gus church schemes as a means of evading taxation."1 In an attempt to
stem this abuse, the IRS issued several new rulings that narrowed the class
of persons who qualify as agents of religious orders.1 5 After issuing these
new rulings the IRS began taxing the wages of members of bona fide reli-
gious orders when they worked outside of their orders.' 6 In effect, the IRS
taxed the member's principal, the religious order.'" Yet when Congress en-
acted the Internal Revenue Code, Congress did not authorize the IRS to
assess taxes on a religious organization unless the organization failed the
operational test or the organizational test." s The IRS, however, declined to
utilize these tests to determine if it could lawfully tax the organization but,
instead, simply claimed that the individual member was the proper taxable
unit because the member no longer functioned as an agent of his order if he
performed outside employment." 9
112. Id.
[The nurse] was assigned by the Society's director to serve as a registered nurse in a
hospital which was in need of doctors and nurses. The details of her activities while work-
ing there were under the supervision of the hospital. . . . It is apparent that the taxpayer
was performing services for the hospital as agent of the Society since at all times she
remained under its general direction and control. Because of this relationship she had no
right to receive or direct the use or disposition of the checks issued to her by the hospital
for her own benefit.
Rev. Rul. 68-123, 1968-1 C.B. 35.
113. See supra note 112. But see Rev. Rul. 83-127, 1983-2 C.B. 25, which states:
Although not specifically stated in Rev. Rul. 68-123, the hospital described in that reve-
nue ruling was an associated institution of the church that exercised administrative super-
vision over both the religious order and the hospital. Thus, with respect to the services
performed for the associated hospital, the nurse is an agent of the religious order.
Rev. Rul. 83-127, 1983-2 C.B. 25.
114. See generally IRS Response to the Illegal Tax Protest Movement, Hearing Before
the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Committee
on Government Operations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981) (extensive discussion of the history
and development of various tax protest schemes).
115. Rev. Rul. 76-323, 1976-2 C.B. 18; Rev. Rul. 77-290, supra note 13.
116. See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 36-58 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 141, 162 and accompanying text.
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In 1976 the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 76-323,11" the first of a series
of rulings that created a narrow definition of agency as it relates to mem-
bers of religious orders. This ruling concerned the issue of whether mem-
bers of a religious order were acting as agents of their order while they
were employed in "nontraditional" jobs such as plumbing and construc-
tion.1 1 The ruling held that a member is an agent acting on behalf of the
religious order only if the order, as the principal, is engaged in the perform-
ance of the services that the member is providing to the secular
employer. 121
For example, a religious member worked for a plumbing company pur-
suant to the regulations of his order that required all members to obtain
outside employment and to turn over their wages to the order. To obtain
such employment, the member entered into the legal relationship of em-
ployer-employee with a third party, the plumbing company. According to
agency law as formulated in Revenue Ruling 76-323, the member could not
be acting as an agent of the religious order because "ordinarily an order is
not engaged in the performance of services as a principal where the legal
relationship of employer and employee exists . . . with respect to the per-
formance of such services. '1 23 In other words, Revenue Ruling 76-323 as-
serted that since the member was an employee of the plumbing company,
he was the agent of the plumbing company and thus he could not also be an
agent of the religious order. Further, the ruling emphasized that the IRS
did not consider the services the member performed as a plumber to be the
equivalent of required religious duties. 12 4 In effect, Revenue Ruling 76-323
gave the IRS authority to tax the income that a member of a religious
order earned when the services were not of the type that a religious order
ordinarily requires members to perform, and the services were performed
for someone other than the order or supervising church.
One year later, in Revenue Ruling 77-290,12' the IRS carried the pol-
icy of taxing members of religious orders one step further. According to
120. 1976-2 C.B. 18.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 19.
123. Id.
124. Id. Rev. Rul. 76-323 seems to be making a distinction between members of reli-
gious orders who perform "traditional" charitable services such as teaching and nursing and
members who perform "nontraditional" services such as plumbing and construction work. Af-
ter stating that plumbers and construction workers are not agents and must include remunera-
tion in gross income, Rev. Rul. 76-323 ends with this comment: "Compare Rev. Rul. 68-123,
1968-1 C.B. 35, which holds that amounts received from a hospital by a registered nurse who
is a member of a religious society exempt from Federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) of
the Code are excludable from gross income under section 61(a) and are not wages subject to
Federal income tax withholding." Rev. Rul. 76-323, 1976-2 C.B. 19.
125. Id. at 26.
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Revenue Ruling 77-290, a member of a religious order is not acting as an
agent of the order if the member works for a third party who is not affili-
ated with the order's church. Presumably, under this ruling, a member is
not acting as an agent even when performing services that further the pur-
poses of the religious order.1 2 The following situation illustrates the prob-
lem. Two members of a religious order that emphasizes teaching as a tradi-
tional religious mission work outside the order for a third party, a large
inner-city high school. One member teaches history and the other is a
janitor. According to Revenue Ruling 76-323, which was issued a year ear-
lier, the janitor is not acting as an agent of the order because he is perform-
ing "nontraditional" services that arguably do not further the purposes of
the religious order. Thus, the janitor will be subject to tax liability on his
wages even if he remits the wages to the order pursuant to a vow of poverty.
However, under the later ruling, Revenue Ruling 77-290, neither the
teacher nor the janitor is acting as an agent of the order while performing
services for a secular employer, the city high school. Even though the
teacher's services directly further the purposes of the order and he remits
his remuneration to the order, the IRS will hold him liable for tax on the
income that he earns. The teacher, however, has no money with which to
pay the tax. He never received nor had a right to receive any of the money
that he earned. He was under the control of the order and acted on its
behalf. He obeyed his vow and complied with the law, both of which obli-
gated him to remit his earnings to the order. Nevertheless, successive reve-
nue rulings further implement this new IRS policy of classifying the wages
that a member receives from outside employment as the member's own tax-
able income.1 27
126. Id. Rev. Rul. 77-290 does not specifically state that a member is not acting as an
agent even if the services performed for a third party are of the type that further the purposes
of the religious order. Rather, Rev. Rul. 77-290 states that if a member of a religious order is
instructed to perform services for an employer affiliated with the supervising church, then the
member will be considered an agent of the order. Id.
Rev. Rul. 77-290 then gives the example of a member of a religious order who works at a
private law firm and performs legal services. Since the private practice of law is not the per-
formance of services of the type ordinarily required by members of the religious order, the
member is required to include in gross income the entire remuneration paid by the law firm.
Rev. Rul. 77-290 does not state whether a member is an agent when the services per-
formed are of the type ordinarily required by members of religious orders but the services are
performed for a secular employer rather than for an employer associated with the supervising
church.
127. Rev. Rul. 84-13, 1984-1 C.B. 21 ("Amounts received by a member of a religious
order, who has taken vows of poverty and obedience, from the member's private practice as a
psychologist are includible in the member's gross income."); Rev. Rul. 81-267, 1981 C.B. 196
("Pay received from a hospital by a member of a religious order who has taken a vow of
poverty and is instructed by the order to obtain outside employment is wages paid by the
hospital under sections 3121(a) and 3401(a) of the Code."); Rev. Rul. 80-332, 1980-2 C.B. 34
("A member of a religious organization who has taken a vow of poverty and is instructed by
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IV. THREE THEORIES DEFINING THE AGENCY CONCEPT IN REVENUE
RULING 77-290
Two recent cases illustrate how the agency principles in Revenue Rul-
ing 77-290 have been defined and applied to members of religious orders
who have taken bona fide vows of poverty. In Fogarty v. United States128
and Schuster v. Commissioner,12 9 the courts acknowledged that the mem-
bers were acting under sincere vows to genuine religious orders. 130 Never-
theless, the courts required the members to pay taxes on income earned
from services rendered to a secular employer even though the services,
teaching and nursing, furthered the purposes of the orders.131 As the two
the organization's superiors to obtain outside employment must include the remuneration re-
mitted to the organization in gross income, and the remuneration is subject to FICA and
income tax withholding."); Rev. Rul. 79-132, 1979-1 C.B. 62 ("Remuneration received from
the Armed Forces by a military chaplin who is a member of a religious order, has taken vows
of poverty, and is required by the order to serve in the Armed Forces and turn over the remu-
neration to the order, is includible in the chaplain's gross income and is subject to the FICA
and income tax withholding."); Rev. Rul. 78-229, 1978-1 C.B. 305 ("Ordinary nonreligious
services performed for a manufacturing company on the company's assembly line by an or-
dained minister, who had worked several years for the company prior to receiving written
instructions from the church to do so, are not 'in the exercise of his ministry' for purposes of
section 3121 of the Code, and the remuneration received for the services is not excepted from
income tax withholding under section 3401,").
128. 6 Cl. Ct. 612 (1984), affid, 780 F.2d 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
129. 84 T.C. 764 (1985), afid, 800 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1986). See generally Comment,
Seventh Circuit's Taxation of Members of Religious Orders - A Change of Habit, 31 CATH.
LAW. 62 (1987) (discussing the Schuster decision).
130. In Fogarty, the court noted:
The facts are not in dispute. . . . [Father Fogarty] is bound to the Order by vows of
chastity, poverty, and obedience. Teaching is an essential and traditional mission of the
Order. In keeping with this mission, Father Fogarty was directed by his religious superior
to pursue an invitation that had been extended to him to interview for a teaching position.
Fogarty v. United States, 780 F.2d 1005, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Similarly, in Schuster the
court stated:
The instant case is unlike many of the so-called "vow of poverty" cases decided recently
by this court in that Sister Francine Schuster at all times acted strictly in accordance
with her vows of poverty and obedience, and at no time after endorsing the checks did she
exercise any sort of control over the funds. Petitioner is part of a long tradition that is
respected in our society, and these private arrangements with her Order arise from deeply
held convictions. The fact that we feel her life is a sincere and worthwhile example
should not, however, alter the tax results.
Schuster v. Commissioner, 84 T.L.C. 764, 773 (1985).
131. In Fogarty the Claims Court found that "Teaching is an essential and traditional
religious mission of [Fogarty's order]. Since its founding in the early 1500s, the [Order] has
been publicly committed to education, and to higher education in particular." Fogarty v.
United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 612, 613 (1984). Similarly, in Schuster Judge Korner noted in his
dissent that:
The purpose of [Schuster's] Order, as expressed in its articles included, inter alia: 'to
conduct hospitals and institutions for the care and treatment of suffering humanity and to
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cases progressed through the trial and appellate courts, three tests were de-
veloped to determine whether a member was an agent of the religious order
and thus entitled to tax exemption under Revenue Ruling 77-290.
A. Loaned-Out Employee Test
In Fogarty,132 Father Fogarty was a member of a religious order. The
purpose of the order was to further higher education.""3 As directed by his
order, Fogarty obtained a teaching position at the University of Virginia.'
Fogarty did not file an income tax return for the years that he worked for
the University because he believed that the wages he received from the
University were tax exempt."" The IRS audited Fogarty's income tax re-
turn, determined that under Revenue Ruling 77-290 he did not earn the
income while acting as his order's agent, and thus required him to report
the income as his own."2
8
In support of its position that Fogarty was not acting as an agent of
the order, the government analogized the situation to loaned-out employee
cases. 1 7 The government argued that if a religious member asserted that he
was an agent of the order, then the member was essentially asserting that
he was a loaned-out employee. 183 The Court of Claims accepted this argu-
ment. The court defined a loaned-out employee to be an employee who is
working for a third party, someone other than his original employer, but
who remits the money earned from the third party to his original employer.
The employer and the third party must have entered into a contract in
which the employer undertook the obligation to ensure that the employee
would provide the services to the third party." 9 Further, the third party
must have accepted the employer's control over the employee's physical
conduct while the employee performed the services for the third party. 40
do all and everything necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of any purposes or
objects and powers above mentioned or incidental thereto.'
Schuster v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 764, 782 (Korner, J., dissenting).
132. 6 Cl. CL 612 (1984).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 613. Fogarty subsequently received an associate professorship at the Univer-
sity. Id. He received a monthly paycheck in his name but he deposited each check in the
order's checking account. Id. at 614. Under the law of Fogarty's church, he had no right to
receive or control the use of the money he earned from the University. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. "[T]he Government also contends that the present situation is analogous to those
cases in which personal services are rendered to a third party by an individual who claims to
be acting as a "loaned-out" employee of the corporation .. " Id. at 615. The argument the
government has presented is controlling here. It can be no other way. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 614.
140. Id. at 615.
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According to the Court of Claims, if a member fits within this definition
then, and only then, is he to be considered an agent of his order. Applying
the loaned-out employee test to Fogarty's situation, the court held that Fo-
garty was not acting as an agent of his order while teaching at the Univer-
sity because his relationship with his order failed both parts of the test: (1)
the order did not control Fogarty's physical conduct while he was teaching
at the University, and (2) the order did not contract with the University
placing an obligation on the order to provide Fogarty's teaching services to
the University. 14 1
B. Triangle Theory
In Schuster,"4 the Tax Court adopted a "triangle theory"' 43 of agency
to determine if a member of a religious order was acting as an agent of the
order while performing outside employment. Francine Schuster, a nurse,
was a member of a religious order. 44 One of the stated purposes of the
order was to aid hospitals in providing services to those who would other-
wise be without medical care.'" With the permission and direction of her
order, Schuster sought and obtained employment in a health care clinic . 46
Like Father Fogarty, Sister Schuster believed the income she received from
her employment was tax exempt under Revenue Ruling 77-290.147 There-
fore, she did not pay taxes on the amounts that she received from the
clinic.148
The IRS, however, determined that Revenue Ruling 77-290 did not
exempt Schuster's income from taxation because Schuster was not acting as
an agent of her order as required by the ruling.149 The Tax Court held that
Schuster was not an agent of her order because all three parties (nun,
141. Id. at 616. The Court of Claims concluded with this statement: "The University
contracted with plaintiff and not his Order. Accordingly, it follows that he is taxable on the
income generated by his services. The court therefore grants the Government's motion for
summary judgment and directs that the complaint be dismissed." Id.
142. Schuster v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 764 (1985).
143. See id. at 775-76.
144. See supra note 130 (describing Schuster's relationship with her order).
145. See supra note 131.
146. Schuster, 84 T.C. at 768-71. Schuster was assigned by a federal agency to work in
a city that was designated a health manpower shortage area because the region lacked ade-
quate medical services. Id. at 768-69. Although Schuster received paychecks in her own name,
she remitted each check to the order and retained no control over them. Id. at 771.
147. Id.
148. Id. Schuster reported $18,771.20 in wages to the IRS but stated on her return that
the compensation was not subject to taxation "by reason of taxpayer being an agent of a
religious order pursuant to Rev. Rul. 77-290." Id.
149. Id. "[The Commissioner] issued a notice of deficiency in which he determined that
petitioner's wages were taxable because she was not working as an agent of a religious order
when she earned her wages." Id.
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clinic, and order) did not participate directly in the agency relationship. 150
Under this triangle theory of agency, a member of a religious order is not
performing services as an agent of the order unless the order is under an
obligation to perform the services. 151 The court held that if the order is not
under a duty to perform the services or to ensure that they are performed,
then the member cannot be acting on the order's behalf. 52 In this case, the
clinic did not contract with Schuster's order and did not place the order
under any obligation. 53 Further, the order did not retain control over
Schuster's daily activities while she worked at the clinic.'" Thus, Schuster
was found to have earned the income in her individual capacity. 1 55
C. Six-Factor Test
When the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 5 6 decided Fogarty,
the court developed a six-factor test to determine if a member had acted as
150. Id. at 774, 778. The Tax Court stated that "the participation of three parties is
required to create an agency relationship .... The Order is not involved at all, except as the
recipient of petitioner's earnings .... We therefore conclude that petitioner earned the in-
come at issue in her individual capacity .. " Id.
151. Id. "What [Schuster] has failed to recognize is that, in the legal sense, one can
perform services for a third party on someone's 'behalf' only if some sort of obligation to
perform the services rests initially with the person on whose behalf one wishes to act." Id. at
774.
152. Id. "If the 'principal' is under no duty to perform the services itself, or to ensure
that the services be performed, but merely approves of the performance as an irrelevant by-
stander, then, in the legal sense of the word, one cannot act on the other's 'behalf." Id.
153. Id. at 775. "[T]he issue is whether [Schuster] performed her services as an em-
ployee of the [clinic], or whether the [clinic] contracted to receive services from the Order,
with [Schuster] performing the services as an agent of the Order. The facts in this case show
that [Schuster] acted to affect only her own legal relationship with the [clinic]." Id.
154. Id. at 771. Schuster and the clinic acted in accordance with this agreement:
[Schuster] shall remain at all times under the direct supervision and control of the
DHEW (Dept. of Health, Educ., and Welfare) Regional Health Administrator or his
designee. Observance of institutional rules and regulations by [Schuster] are mere inci-
dents of the performance of her Federal functions and do not alter her direct professional
responsibility to the Secretary. . . . Day-to-day administrative direction will be given by
the Project Director (an employee of the clinic).
Id.
155. Id. at 778. The court stated that the rule that an agent should not be taxed on
amounts he receives from his principal depends upon the existence of some form of legal rela-
tionship between the principal and a third party. Id. at 775. The court further stated that there
must exist between the principal and the third party a contract recognizing the principal's
controlling position. Id. at 775-76. See also Johnson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 882 (1982),
afl'd without published opinion, 734 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1984) (income earned by an agent not
imputed to principal because control of agent's activities and recognition by third party were
lacking).
156. Created in 1982, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Fed.
Cir.) is the successor to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and also has
appellate jurisdiction over the Court of Claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
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an agent of the order and was entitled to report his individual earnings as
tax exempt under Revenue Ruling 77-290.57 This test was later nominally
adopted by the Seventh Circuit Court in deciding Schuster on appeal. 58
According to these two appellate courts, six factors are relevant in deter-
mining if an agency relationship "exists: (1) the degree of control exercised
by the order over the member; (2) the ownership rights between the mem-
ber and the order; (3) the purposes or mission of the order; (4) the type of
work performed vis-a-vis the purposes or mission; (5) the dealings between
the member and the third party; and (6) the dealings between the third
party and the order. 59
After listing these factors, the Federal Circuit Court declined to ex-
plain how an application of these factors to Fogarty would result in Father
Fogarty not qualifying as an agent under Revenue Ruling 77-290. Basi-
cally, the Federal Circuit Court let the Court of Claims' decision stand. 60
This affirmation of the lower court allowed the inference that it was proper
for a court to rule that an agency relationship does not exist if there is not a
contract between the member's employer and the order in which it is
agreed that the order is the party obligated to perform the services.
In Schuster, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court purportedly applied
the Federal Circuit Court's six-factor test, but in reality it applied the two-
part analysis of the loaned-out employee test that was favored by the Court
of Claims.'' The Seventh Circuit Court emphasized that the clinic, rather
than the order, exercised day-to-day control over Schuster. Thus, the court
held that Schuster performed her duties as an employee of the clinic and
was acting on her own behalf and not as an agent of the order.162
An examination of the three theories used to determine if an agency
relationship exists between the member and the order, allowing the mem-
ber's income to be tax exempt under Revenue Ruling 77-290, shows that
the courts have been requiring the presence of two factors in an agency
relationship: (1) the order must have day-to-day control over the member's
157. Fogarty v. United States, 780 F.2d 1005, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
158. Schuster v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 1986) ("In adopting this
flexible test approach, we reject the so called 'agency triangle' .. "). But see id. at 680
(Cudahy, J., dissenting) ("The majority ostensibly applies a 'six-part' test derived from [Fo-
garty] . . . . In fact, the majority's application of its own test looks somewhat like [the
loaned-out employee test that was set out in] Johnson.").
159. Schuster, 800 F.2d at 678; Fogarty, 780 F.2d at 1012.
160. Fogarty, 780 F.2d at 1013. The court merely stated "our review of the decision
indicates that the [lower] court considered all of the undisputed facts of record." Id. See also
Schuster, 800 F.2d at 680 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the Federal Circuit
Court applied the six-factor test to Fogarty "with a minimum of analysis").
161. See supra note 158.
162. Schuster, 800 F.2d at 679 (stating the majority opinion that Schuster was acting
on her own behalf because she was a clinic employee).
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conduct, and (2) there must be a contract between the member's employer
and the order placing the order under an obligation to ensure that the mem-
ber actually provides the services to the employer.163 Under this two-part
test, Father Fogarty did not qualify as an agent of his order.'" First, as an
employee of the University, Fogarty was subject to general control by the
University, rather than by his order, and was expected to conduct his clas-
ses in a University-approved manner.'65 Second, the University did not con-
tract with the order placing the order under a duty to ensure that Fogarty's
teaching services were provided. 66
Similarly, Sister Schuster did not qualify as an agent of her order be-
cause Schuster's order and her secular employer, the clinic, did not enter
into a contract agreeing that the order and not the clinic was responsible for
overseeing Schuster's daily activities.6 7 Also, there was no agreement obli-
gating the order to make certain that Schuster provided nursing services to
the clinic.' 68 For these two reasons, Sister Schuster was not allowed tax
exemption under Revenue Ruling 77-290 as an agent of her order.'6"
V. RECENT AGENCY DEFINITION V. RESTATEMENT AGENCY LAW
A. IRS Definition Causes Inequitable Results
The two-part test that the courts have developed to determine if a
member is an agent creates a narrow definition of the agency relationship
that is required for a member to qualify for tax exemption under Revenue
Ruling 77-290."1° This definition has served its purpose by denying tax-ex-
empt status to taxpayers who are involved in bogus church schemes."' Al-
163. Fogarty v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 612, 614 (1984), affid, 780 F.2d 1005, 1013;
Schuster, 800 F.2d at 678, 679; Hogan v. United States, 47 A.F.T.R. 2d 86-338 at 342;
McEneany v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,413 at 1890 (1986). See also Luechtefeld
v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85,227 (1985) (a nun working as para-legal at a legal
aid clinic); Young v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 85,228 (1985) (a nun working as a
librarian at a public library); Laurent v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85,229 (1985) (a
nun working as a secretary and counselor in an alcohol rehabilitation clinic); all applying the
Schuster court's triangle theory and imposing taxes on members of religious orders working on
missions related to their religious ministries. See generally Philipps, Vows of Poverty, supra
note 19, at 32-36 (discussing the similarity of the three agency theories).
164. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. See also Philipps, Vows of Poverty,
supra note 19, at 27 (suggesting that the Service has used agency principles to attack bogus
church schemes in order to bypass the first amendment problems associated with questioning
the validity of a church or religious order).
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though such taxpayers "join" a religious order, they remain employed by
their secular employer so that they can continue to receive the same
amount of income as they did before taking their "vow of poverty."'
72
When a taxpayer joins a bogus religious order, the employer and the
taxpayer retain the same relationship (employer-employee) that they had
before the taxpayer joined a religious order. The employer does not contract
with the taxpayer's new "order" to receive the same services from the tax-
payer that the employer has already been receiving.173 Further, the em-
ployer, and not the bogus religious order, controls the taxpayer's physical
conduct while he is performing services for the employer. 174 Thus, the tax-
payer will not qualify as an agent of his order under the court's strict two-
part agency test. The courts and the IRS have found an effective, easy way
to deny tax exemption to members of bogus religious orders who were rely-
ing on O.D. 119 to shelter their income from taxation." 5
Unfortunately, as Father Fogarty and Sister Schuster's situations illus-
trate, the court's narrow definition of agency has also had the inequitable
result of taxing the income of religious members who have taken bona fide
vows of poverty.'17  This inequitable result occurred because the courts did
not correctly apply agency law to the facts. 77 First, the courts failed to
172. See, e.g., Mone v. Commissioner, 774 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1985). Two taxpayers took
bogus vows of poverty to the Life Science Church. One taxpayer remained a New York City
sanitation worker and received $20,142 in 1980. Id. at 571. The other taxpayer remained
employed as an electrical engineer and earned $38,684 in 1980. Id. Both retained control over
their income but claimed exemption on their 1980 income tax return. Id. at 573. See also
Stephenson v. Commissioner, 748 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1984) (taxpayer took a "vow of poverty"
but continued practicing as a private physician and was paid wages of over $50,000 in 1976,
which he used to buy a new home); Pollard v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1303 (1984).
This was a consolidated case involving 20 families who created religious orders under the Cal-
vary Temple Church. Id. at 1306. Brooks remained employed by Delta Air Lines as a cus-
tomer services agent and received $24,486 in 1980. Id. at 1313. Dollar remained employed by
N.C.R. Corp. as an engineer and received $23,230 in 1980. Id. at 1314. Egerdahl remained
employed as a courier for Federal Express and received $22,854 in 1980. Id. at 1315. Johnston
remained employed by Eastern Airlines as a mechanic and received $27,806 in 1979. Id. at
1316-17. All of these taxpayers retained control over their income but claimed exemption on
their income tax returns. Id. at 1311.
173. In some cases the taxpayer's employer requires the taxpayer to sign a statement
agreeing that the employer has no involvement with the taxpayers' religious order; the taxpay-
ers usually stipulate that their secular employers had no contracts or agreements with any
religious order. See Mone, 774 F.2d at 573.
174. See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the control in an
employer-employee relationship.
175. Apparently the IRS has won every case against bogus church schemes when the
taxpayer relied on agency principles.
176. See supra notes 132-55 and accompanying text.
177. See infra notes 178-97 and accompanying text. See also B. HOPKINS, supra note 2,
at 193.
The concern of the IRS about mail order ministries . . . are leading the IRS to many
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consider that there is more than one type of agent.178 The requirement that
the principal have day-to-day control over the agent, the first part of the
two-part test set out by the courts, described only one type of agent: the
servant-agent. 17 Second, the existence of a contract between the order and
the member's employer, expressly placing an obligation on the order, is not
necessary to create an agency relationship between the member and the
order.1 80 Only two parties, the agent and the principal, need to enter into an
agreement to form an agency relationship. 81 The party receiving the ser-
vices from the agent, here the member's employer, must be aware that the
agent is acting on behalf of a principal.' 8 ' Thus, the second part of the
court's two-part agency test is also contrary to settled agency law.
B. Restatement Agency Law Applied to Religious Members
In general Restatement terms, an agency relationship is a fiduciary re-
lationship that is created when two parties agree that one of the parties will
act for the other party and be subject to his control. 183 The degree of the
principal's control over the physical acts of the agent is the important factor
in determining if the agent is a servant-agent (employee) or an independent
contractor-agent."8 If the principal controls the day-to-day activities of the
adverse decisions which, in turn, are causing like decisions by the courts, so that the law
is shaping up as being appropriately tough as regards the sham situations but it is formu-
lating some legal principles that are highly questionable when applied outside the areas of
abuse.
Id.
For further discussion, see Philipps, Vows of Poverty, supra note 19, at 20 ("The abrupt
change in IRS policy during the 1970s was unfair from a policy standpoint and at least ques-
tionable from a legal standpoint."); Schuster v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 764, 785 (1985) (Kor-
ner, J., dissenting) ("The 'triangle' theory applied here is premised upon an inaccurate ap-
praisal of the law of agency as well as the facts of this case ... only two parties are required
to create an agency relationship.").
178. See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (discussing servant-agents).
179. See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
180. See Philipps, Vows of Poverty, supra note 19, at 33 ("The triangle theory requires
that the third party always be aware of and deal directly with the principal. The triangle
theory would, therefore, if taken to its logical conclusion, preclude agency relationships involv-
ing an undisclosed principal.")
"An undisclosed principal is bound by contracts and conveyances made on his account by
an agent acting within his authority . . . ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 186
(1957). "It may be said that the principal becomes a party to the contract by operation of law,
without the will of the third party." Id. § 186 comment a.
181. See infra notes 183-216 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957) provides: "Agency is the fiduciary
relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the
other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control and consent by the other so to act."
184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 comment a (1957) provides: "The ex-
tent of the right to control the physical acts of the agent is an important factor in determining
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agent, then the agent is a servant-agent.18 A servant (employee) is an
agent employed to perform services for a master (employer).18 Employees
are agents of their employer when acting within the scope of their employ-
ment if the employer controls, or has the right to control, the physical con-
duct of the employee. 8 "
According to the courts in Fogarty'88 and Schuster,89 a member is an
agent of his order only if the member remains an employee (servant-agent)
of the order while the member is performing services for a secular em-
ployer.' 90 Thus, the member must remain subject to the order's control over
his daily conduct.' 9' In formulating this requirement, the courts have over-
looked the fact that a member of a religious order can be an agent of the
order without being the order's employee. A member of a religious order is
an agent of the order if the member qualifies as an independent contractor-
whether or not a master-servant relation between them exists." See Meister v. United States,
319 F.2d 875 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
The existence of the state of employment, as we see it, consists of two primary factors
which may exist in varying degrees. The first of these is the degree of physical proximity
between the employee and the employer, and the second factor concerns the strength of
the manifestations of the employee's intention to be doing his employer's business. These
two factors create the substance of the classic common law test of the master-servant
relationship - whether the employer has control or right to control the employee.
Id.
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1957) provides:
(1) A master is a principal who employs an agent to perform service in his affairs and
who controls or has the right to control the physical conduct of the other in the perform-
ance of the service.
(2) A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose
physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to control by
the master.
186. Id.
187. "The term 'scope of employment' refers to those acts which are so closely con-
nected with what the servant is employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental to it,
that they may be regarded as methods, even though quite improper ones, of carrying out the
employment." W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
ToRTs 502 (5th ed. 1984).
188. Fogarty v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 612 (1985), af'd, 780 F.2d 1005 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
189. Schuster v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 764 (1985), affd, 800 F.2d 672 (7th Cir.
1986).
190. Fogarty at 614-15 (a member is an agent of his order only if he remains an em-
ployee of his order and has been "loaned-out" to the third party); Schuster v. Commissioner,
800 F.2d 672, 679 (7th Cir. 1986) (member was not an agent of her order because she was an
employee of a third party and not an employee of the order). But see Philipps, Vows of Pov-
erty, supra note 19, at 33 ("Sister Francine's potential status as an employee of [the clinic]
does not preclude her from remaining the Order's agent at the same time."); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 226 (1957) (an agent can act at the same time with respect to two
principals as long as service to one principal does not constitute abandonment of the other).
191. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
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agent. 92
An independent contractor, like an employee, performs services for an-
other. Unlike an employee, however, he is not subject to the other's control
with respect to the independent contractor's physical conduct.' 9 ' Neverthe-
less, an independent contractor is an agent when he is performing services
for another and is subject to the other's control, except with respect to his
physical conduct.' Members of religious orders are acting as independent
contractors of their orders when they work for secular employers and remit
the remuneration they earn to their order.195 The members are also agents
of their order because they are acting as fiduciaries of their order, and the
member and the order have agreed that the member will act for the order
and be subject to the order's control. 196 The relationship between member
and order meets the Restatement definition of agency.' 97
To qualify as an independent contractor-agent of his order, a member
must satisfy four criteria. First, the member must have entered into a con-
tract with the order agreeing to do something for the order.'"9 When a
member joins a religious order, he executes an agreement promising to
abide by the rules of the order and to perform services that will further the
192. See infra notes 193-216 and accompanying text.
193. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1957) (an independent contractor is
not subject to control with respect to his physical conduct; he may or may not be an agent).
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14N provides: "One who contracts to act
on behalf of another and subject to the other's control except with respect to his physical
conduct is an agent and also an independent contractor." See also D.R.R. v. English Enter-
prises, CATV, 356 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Iowa App. 1984) (a person can be both an agent and an
independent contractor); Columbia Broadcast Sys., Inc. v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 522 F.2d
369 (2d Cir. 1975) stating that:
We are also fully aware that an independent contractor, one who is not subject to the
right of another to control his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking,
may or may not be an agent. . . .The usual "agent", broker, factor, attorney is an inde-
pendent contractor (and not a servant) but also an agent. It is only colloquially that the
terms independent contractor and agent are necessarily distinct.
Id. at 375 & n.14.
195. A member of a religious order is performing duties for his order in every undertak-
ing. His vows to the order require him to act only in furtherance of the order's religious pur-
poses. See Schuster v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 672, 673 (7th Cir. 1986). See also Order of St.
Benedict v. Steinhauser, 234 U.S. 640, 651 (1914) (vows held to be a binding agreement on
both parties).
196. See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
198. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (stating that an independent contrac-
tor is one who contracts with another to do something for him). See also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 2 comment b ("An agent who is not a servant is, therefore, an indepen-
dent contractor when he contracts to act on account of the principal."); W. SEAVY, AGENCY
(1964) § 6 ("For agency purposes, any one who acts for, or contracts with, the principal other
than a servant, is an independent contractor.").
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religious purposes of the order.199 This agreement is a binding contract, en-
forceable against the member in a court of law.2"
Second, for a member who is acting as an independent contractor to be
an agent of the order, he must be a fiduciary of the order.21 A member of a
religious order is a fiduciary of his order because he has a duty to act pri-
marily for the benefit of his order. As a participant in a communal group, 0
a religious member does not act on his own behalf but acts together with
the other members to further the order's religious purposes. 0 The mem-
ber's vows to the order place upon him the duties of loyalty and obedi-
ence.204 The presence of these two duties further establish that the member
is a fiduciary of his order.2 0 5
Third, although the member must be subject to the order's control, this
does not imply that the order needs to exert day-to-day control over the
physical acts of the member.2 06 Rather, sufficient control exists if the order
has ultimate authority over the member while the member works for some-
one outside the order.2 07 A member of a religious order is always subject to
the order's control. The order's control over the member is present even
199. See, e.g., Schuster v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 672, 682 (7th Cir. 1986) (nun's vow
of obedience required her to be completely subservient to the will of her superiors); Hogan v.
United States, 57 A.F.T.R. 2d 86-342 (D. Me. 1985) (Catholic chaplain clearly required to
abide by the requirements of his order); McEneany v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H)
86,413, 86,1890 (1986) (chaplain at state hospital for the mentally disabled required by vows
to his order to follow the directions of the Archdiocese of Los Angeles); Fogarty v. United
States, 6 Cl. Ct. 612, 613 (1984) (priest accepted teaching position upon instruction from his
superior in conformance with his vow of obedience).
200. See Order of St. Benedict v. Steinhauser, 234 U.S. 640, 651 (1914).
201. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 2 comment b (an independent contractor is not an agent if is he is not a fiduciary).
"An agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope of his agency." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13. "The agreement to act on behalf of the principal
causes the agent to be a fiduciary, that is, a person having a duty, created by his undertaking,
to act primarily for the benefit of another in matters connected with his undertaking." Id. § 13
comment a.
202. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
203. See generally SACRAMENTUM MuNDI, supra note 8 (general discussion of religious
orders).
204. Id.
205. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14N comment a, which states:
Most of the persons known as agents. . . are independent contractors. . . since they are
contractors but, although employed to perform services, are not subject to the control or
right to control of the principal with respect to their physical conduct in the performance
of the services. However, they fall within the category of agents. They are fiduciaries;
they owe to the principal the basic obligations of agency; loyalty and obedience.
Id.
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14, supra note 194.
207. Id. (defining an independent contractor-agent to be a person who is subject to the
principal's general control, but not subject to control over his daily physical conduct).
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when a member works for a secular employer. 20 8 Although the member's
employer controls the member's daily activities while at work, the member
is at all times expected to strictly adhere to the vows he made to his or-
der.20 9 The member must receive permission from his order before ob-
taining outside employment, the employment must further the purposes of
the order, and the order can require the member to terminate the employ-
ment or to refrain from certain activities in the course of carrying out the
employment. 10
Finally, for the member to qualify as an agent and receive tax-exempt
status under Revenue Ruling 77-290, the order must control the income
that the member earns.2 ' Any outside employment that the member under-
takes must be a requirement of the member's religious duties to the or-
der.2"2 Futhermore, the order must have sole claim to the earnings that the
member receives. 21 3 Again, the member's vows to the order satisfy this re-
quirement.2 ' Although a member is free to terminate association with the
order at any time, any income earned by the member prior to that termina-
tion must be remitted to the order.21 5 The member does not have a claim of
right to any income earned or property acquired while he was a member.21 6
C. Restatement Agency Law Applied to Bogus Church Schemes
In view of the Restatement agency law, a member of a genuine reli-
gious order who has taken a bona fide vow of poverty is the agent of the
order while performing services for a secular employer.2 ' 7 The member is
an independent contractor and is also an agent.21 8 Thus, the member is en-
titled to tax exemption under Revenue Ruling 77-290.219
208. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 81, at Canon 601 which provides:
"The evangelical counsel of obedience ... obliges submission of one's will to lawful Superiors
.Id.
210. See, e.g., Schuster v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 764, 766 (1985) (religious members
are not allowed to undertake employment without permission of their Superior and the Supe-
rior can require the member to withdraw from employment if it is deemed necessary).
211. Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 347-48 (1920) (agent not
taxed on amounts received on behalf of insurance company because the insurance company
controlled the earning of the income).
212. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 1, supra note 183 (agent must be act-
ing on another's behalf and with consent).
213. Maryland Casualty Co., 251 U.S. at 346-47.
214. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 196-216 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 195-216 and accompanying text.
219. Under Rev. Rul. 77-290 a member of a religious order is not taxed on amounts
received while working as the order's agent. Rev. Rul. 77-290, 1977-2 C.B. 26.
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However, a taxpayer who is involved in a bogus church scheme is not
necessarily an agent of his order and, therefore, is not entitled to tax ex-
emption. First, the taxpayer is not a servant-agent of his order because the
order does not exercise control over his physical conduct while he is working
for a secular employer.220 Second, the taxpayer is not an independent con-
tractor-agent because the taxpayer's relationship with his order does not
meet the four criteria set out above. 221
Although the taxpayer who is a member of a bogus religious order may
be able to show that he entered into a contract agreeing to do something for
the order222 and thus satisfy the first requirement of agency, the taxpayer
must pass the other three parts of the agency test. An agent is under a
duty, as a fiduciary, to act primarily for the benefit of his principal. 228 A
taxpayer involved in a bogus church scheme is not acting as a fiduciary of
his order. The taxpayer is acting primarily for his own benefit. He is using
his religious order as a scam to evade taxes that he legally owes. There is no
benefit to the order in this agreement; the order is used to benefit the
taxpayer.22
4
Next, the taxpayer must be subject to his order's control.2 25 In a bogus
church scheme, the order does not retain any control over the taxpayer
while he is at work. Rather, the taxpayer retains control over the order.226
Finally, the order must control, and have sole claim to, the income that the
taxpayer earns.22 7 This requirement is not met in a bogus church scheme.
Although the taxpayer may turn over his income to his order, the order is
merely a conduit and the income flows back to the taxpayer.228
220. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
222. Members of bogus religious orders often execute agreements, sometimes called
"vows," with their orders. See, e.g., Pollard v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1303, 1307
(1984).
223. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
224. The Church of Scientology of California is an illustrative example. Between 1971
and 1972 the California church paid founder L. Ron Hubbard $115,680 in salary, over
$100,000 in royalty payments, and over $3.5 million to Hubbard's bank account in Switzer-
land. Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 823 F.2d 1310, 1314-15 (9th Cir. 1987). The
court held that "L. Ron Hubbard's unfettered control over millions of dollars of Church assets
. . . coupled with the church's failure to carry its burden of proof and to disclose the facts
candidly, proved conclusively that the Church was operated for the benefit of L. Ron Hubbard
and his family." Id. at 1317.
225. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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VI. OPERATIONAL TEST APPLIED TO BOGUS CHURCH SCHEMES
A taxpayer involved in a bogus church scheme will rarely be able to
qualify as an agent under the four-part test of agency. If the taxpayer does
not qualify as an agent of his order, he loses tax exemption and his bogus
church scheme will be defeated. 2 If, however, an ingenious taxpayer is
able to structure the relationship between taxpayer and bogus church so as
to fit the form of the agency test, but not the substance, the IRS can defeat
the scheme without creating unjust results. The IRS has the power to use
the operational test2"' of section 501 to revoke the tax-exempt status of the
church. Of the four elements of the operational test,2 3 1 the second element,
prohibiting inurement of organizational funds to private individuals, and
the fourth element, requiring the organization to serve a valid public pur-
pose, would be the most difficult for a bogus church to satisfy.
Most bogus churches would fail the operational test because of the
presence of private inurement. 232 Inurement occurs when an individual, by
virtue of his relationship with his organization, is able to apply the organi-
zation's financial resources to his private purposes that do not further the
tax-exempt purposes of the organization.23 3 Thus, an organization cannot be
tax exempt if its primary purpose is to benefit private individuals even if the
organization also engages in exempt activities. 3 4 If the IRS believes that
private inurement has occurred in an organization, the IRS can challenge
the organization's right to tax-exempt status.2 35 The organization then has
the burden of proving that none of its net earnings inured to a private indi-
229. Rev. Rul. 77-290, 1977-2 C.B. 26.
230. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
231. The four elements of the operational test are: (1) activities further a religious pur-
pose; (2) no inurement to private individuals; (3) resources not spent to influence legislation;
and (4) organization serves a valid public purpose. Church of Scientology v. Commissioner,
823 F.2d 1310, 1315 (9th Cir. 1987).
232. See id.
233. See generally B. HOPKINS, supra note 2, at 239-64 (extensive discussion of the
concept of private inurement in charitable organizations).
234. B. HOPKINs, supra note 2, at 240 ("In determining the presence of any proscribed
private inurement, the law looks to the ultimate purpose of the organization: if the basic pur-
pose of the organization is to benefit private individuals, then it cannot be tax-exempt, even
though exempt activities may also be performed. ). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
l(d)(l)(ii) which provides that:
An organization is not organized or operated exclusively for one or more [exempt pur-
poses] unless it serves a public rather than a private interest. Thus, to meet the require-
ment of this subdivision, it is necessary for an organization to establish that it is not
organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as designated individuals,
the creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled, directly
or indirectly, by such private interests.
Id.
235. TAX CT. R. OF PRAC. & PROC. 217(c)(2)(i).
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vidual.13 Requiring strict adherence to this element of the operational test
would eliminate the vast majority of bogus churches.
In some' cases where, in practice, the net earnings of a bogus church
inured to a private individual, the church could conceivably prove that tech-
nically such private inurement did not occur and all net earnings were used
for religious purposes. This possibility exists because the concept of "reli-
gious purpose" is broad. 3" In these cases the IRS should make further in-
quiry of the church to ascertain that the fourth element of the operational
test is met, which requires an organization to serve a valid public pur-
pose. 38 Thus, if the "religious purpose" of the church is to relieve its mem-
bers of the burden of paying taxes,239 the IRS should deny tax-exempt sta-
tus for the church because it is not conferring a public benefit. The statutes
providing tax exemptions are not construed to be applicable to organiza-
tions that act contrary to public policy. 40 Furthermore, the government has
an overriding interest in protecting its ability to collect taxes and provide
for the general welfare.
241
VI. CONCLUSION
The rapid spread of bogus church schemes has caused the IRS to re-
quire members of religious orders to comply with a narrow definition of
agency before qualifying for tax exemption under Revenue Ruling 77-290.
The IRS' overzealous reaction, however, inequitably taxes religious income
that historically has been tax exempt. The government, in its zeal to sup-
press bogus church schemes, has convinced the courts that members of reli-
gious orders are not agents of their orders when they are employed by secu-
lar employers. The government has been able to do this by arguing that a
principal-agent relationship has to meet the standards of an employer-em-
ployee relationship. The courts, which are also anxious to find a way to
prevent tax avoidance, have accepted this argument. The courts, however,
are not applying true agency law to the cases and are failing to recognize
that religious members can work for a secular employer, under that em-
ployer's control, and still remain a non-servant agent of the order. Members
of religious orders who perform services for secular employers are acting as
independent contractors of their order and are also agents of their order
236. Note, Mail Order Ministries, supra note 40, at 980 ("Once the Service decides to
challenge an exemption or deduction, the burden is on the organization or the taxpayer to
prove entitlement to the benefit.").
237. See supra note 40.
238. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
240. See B. HOPKINS, supra note 2, at 144 (discussing the public policy test of Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)).
241. See generally Simon, Applying the Bob Jones Public-Policy Test, supra note 57.
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when their services further the religious purposes of the order. Under these
circumstances, a member of a religious order is entitled to tax exemption
under Revenue Ruling 77-290.
The IRS can prevent taxpayers from using church scams to evade
taxes without distorting agency law. If a taxpayer can devise a church
scheme that meets all of the requirements of agency, then the IRS can deny
tax-exempt status to the church the taxpayer has created. The operational
test of section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code provides the IRS with a
means of separating bona fide churches and religious orders, which are enti-
tled to tax exemption, from fraudulent tax evasion schemes, which should
be exposed and taxed. The use of the operational test will enable the IRS to
detect church scams without challenging the validity of the religion, which
would raise serious first amendment problems. Churches and their auxiliary
organizations are tax exempt because they provide valuable benefits to soci-
ety. Under section 501, they are not entitled to tax exemption if they in-
crease the wealth of private individuals or if their actions are contrary to
public policy. Bogus church schemes, by definition, are created to frustrate
the policy of our income tax collection system and thereby increase the
wealth of their creator. As such, bogus churches will not pass the opera-
tional test. Thus, the operational test of section 501 provides the IRS with a
weapon to detect frauds without formulating dubious agency principles that
"extract taxes from a poverty-pledged nun doing corporal works of mercy
on behalf of a religious community."2""
WANDA F. REED
242. Schuster v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 672, 679 (7th Cir. 1986) (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting).
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